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Abstract—We advance the state-of-the-art in cascading failure
simulation through an integrated modeling of system dynamics
and protection coupled with data processing that analyzes the
simulation results. An enhanced version of the TS3ph-CAPE
simulator is used to produce the cascading data. The cascading
data is processed to produce metrics describing the cascading size
and risk, and to identify critical components contributing most
to the cascading risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
The protection system operation and misoperation plays
a central role in blackouts because it is the main way that
power system components are disconnected and load is shed.
Widespread cascading blackouts always involve many protec-
tion actions that interact with each other and with the power
system transient dynamics that are excited by the progression
of events [1]–[3]. The protection system and transient inter-
actions that cause blackouts are often unusual, rare, or poorly
understood interactions, because the most common and easily
analyzed problems have already been eliminated by engineers.
If we deterministically simulate the typical performance
of the power system, we will usually not encounter cascading
events. That is, the power grid is designed and operated to have
high reliability, so that its typical behavior has little cascading.
But cascading does sometimes occur when combinations of
rare and unusual events happen, and we do need to somehow
account for this. The way forward is to simulate the power grid
in a probabilistic way that allows for rare events or interactions
to occur and then process the results to evaluate the risk of the
cascading and to identify critical components [4]. Indeed this
paper pursues this goal with advanced simulation and new data
processing in order to initially demonstrate this innovative and
useful approach to power system reliability.
To elaborate, we can contrast two approaches to studying
and mitigating cascading:
(1) Analysis of typical performance. One chooses a moderately
stressed power system condition, and simulates the likely and
typical performance for a class of faults. The protection system
is assumed to work as designed. If any fault leads to significant
cascading then that cascade is mitigated.
(2) In a comprehensive analysis sampling all performance, one
samples from a range of stressed power system conditions, and
simulates the performance for a class of faults. The protection
system failures and more unusual interactions are considered.
Many possibilities, including a sampling of rare events and
interactions, are simulated. The risk of cascading is quantified.
If the risk of cascading is too high, critical components
contributing to that risk are identified and mitigated. Note
that if one performs a comprehensive sampling of all the
possibilities, a risk based approach is essential because it is not
economic to mitigate combinations of events with low risk.
This paper initiates work towards approach (2) by developing
detailed protection system modeling and analysis that samples
from the initiating faults and considers the possibilities of stuck
breakers. Some aspects of the paper are elaborated in much
more detail in the forthcoming report [5].
Given the central importance of the protection system
actions and the ubiquity of dynamic transients as the protection
acts, one would think that the study of unusual protection
system interactions would be routine. This is far from the case.
The state of the art for detailed protection system design is to
simulate typical cases on a more individual basis and to screen
deterministically for some limited possibilities, particularly the
case of a single contingency of one component failing or
one misoperation that underlies the N-1 criterion. And when
analyzing cascading failure at the system level, the state of
the art usually ignores dynamics and models the protection
system in a very crude way. For example, the TRELSS industry
cascading failure model has groups of protection devices
acting together and ignores transient dynamics [6]. Another
example is the protection hidden failure modeling in which
lines whose ends are “exposed” by a line outage trip with a
loading dependent probability [7]. Recent work is progressing
to deterministically model the typical behavior of protection
models and dynamics with an applicability to cascading in
large systems [8]. The objectives of our work complement
[8] by simulating in a probabilistic context a smaller network
with more detailed protection models. Indeed, our simulation
platform, known as TS3ph-CAPE, models the transmission
network as a complete three-phase, possibly unbalanced, sys-
tem and models the protection system down to the individual
manufacturer specific relays. Additional details are provided
in the next section.
II. SIMULATION WITH DETAILED PROTECTION MODELS
In this work, an integrated dynamics and protection simu-
lator, TS3ph-CAPE, shown in Fig. 1, is used for producing
the cascading data. TS3ph-CAPE uses a full three-phase
representation of the power system to enable analysis of
unbalanced operating conditions, such as unbalanced loads and
disturbances, and includes a variety of generator, control, and
load models. To simulate the role of protection in cascading
failures, the simulator interfaces with Electrocon’s widely-use
commercial package CAPE. TS3ph and CAPE communicate
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media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or
redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
Fig. 1. TS3ph-CAPE platform architecture
through a socket at the end of each time domain integration
step. Once the differential and algebraic equations describing
the generation and transmission systems have been solved,
TS3ph passes three-phase voltages and three-phase currents to
CAPE. Then, CAPE evaluates the relay elements and notifies
TS3ph of any future breaker operations.
TS3ph models the entire transmission system as a three-
phase network, including three-phase transformer configura-
tions, such as delta-wye-grounded. Three-phase models were
chosen to make it easier to include unbalanced operating con-
ditions, such as untransposed transmission lines, single-pole
switching and independently controlled transmission devices,
such as a static var compensator (SVC).
For the generation system, detailed round-rotor and salient
pole machines can be included, along with saturation. Com-
mon exciters, governors, stabilizers and compensators can be
included also. These generator controllers typically contain
nonlinear elements, such as windup and non-windup limiters,
as well as deadband elements.
For the system loads, a basic static model is available
for real and reactive power load as a function of voltage
magnitude. Additionally, a three-phase induction motor model
is available with five dynamic states.
For the protection system, CAPE has hundreds of manu-
facturer specific relay models available. For this project, the
following common relay elements were incorporated into the
various substations:
• distance (line protection)
• over-current (backup protection)
• current differential (bus and transformer protection)
• under-/over-frequency (generator protection)
In addition to modeling the relay elements, the TS3ph-CAPE
simulator has the ability to model breaker failure. At the end
of each time-domain integration step, TS3ph sends voltages,
currents and breaker status values to CAPE and receives
breaker operations from CAPE. For each breaker operation,
TS3ph “rolls the dice” and determines if the breaker operation
should be executed. This decision involves the comparison of
a randomly generated number against a user-defined threshold.
If the breaker operation is determined to have “failed”, then
TS3ph ignores the switching instruction received from CAPE.
Although the TS3ph-CAPE simulator has the ability to do so,
proper breaker failure protection, that would normally contain
cascading provoked by a stuck breaker on a faulted system,
was not modeled for this project.
TS3ph models disturbances as switching events. Unbal-
anced faults, such as single-line-to-ground, line-to-line and
double-line-to-ground faults can be included at any time during
the simulation. Three-phase faults also can be included. Both
bus faults and “end-of-line” faults can be simulated.
For large-scale simulations, TS3ph has the ability to run
the computations in parallel across multiple processing cores.
TS3ph is built on the parallel-enabled PETSc library developed
by Argonne National Laboratory. PETSc provides state-of-
the-art data structures, linear solvers, nonlinear solvers, time-
domain integration algorithms and interfaces to third-party
applications, such as partitioning packages for parallel com-
putation.
III. SIMULATED CASCADES
The cascading data produced by the enhanced version of
the TS3ph-CAPE simulator is summarized:
(1) Many sampled cascades. Here a cascade of events
includes an initiating event such as a line fault that is possibly
followed by a series of dependent events. We need to include
in the cascades not only the long cascades of most interest
that lead to load shed, but also the single initiating events and
the shorter cascades, since these are successes that need to be
included in any fair assessment of risk.
(2) There is variation and uncertainty in the system initial
state, the initiating faults, and the progress of the cascade
[9]. To be realistic, multiple cascades must be sampled in an
unbiased way across the full ranges of uncertainties in order
to properly estimate the probabilities and risks of cascading.
This paper samples from the following uncertainties: (a) initial
loading level, (b) initiating fault, and (c) whether a breaker fails
to open when it is supposed to.
(3) The simulated cascading output data required for anal-
ysis is a list of discrete events with the exact time that they
occurred and the component description. The discrete events
include initiating fault, line and transformer trips, breaker
misoperations, and load shed.
The test system has 130 buses. Two of the cascades are
shown in Fig. 2.
IV. PROCESSING CASCADING DATA TO OBTAIN
PROPAGATION AND RISK METRICS
The first task is to divide the events of each cascade into
generations. Each generation of events either ends the cascade
or produces a further generation of events. Generally primary
protection acts as locally as possible to isolate a fault and
secondary protection of neighboring components only acts if
there is a misoperation or a severe transient. Accordingly, the
outages in a cascade are divided into successive generations
Fig. 2. Two examples of simulated cascades on the 130-bus test system.
Numbers on lines are the generation number. The initial line fault occurs on the
line labeled generation 1. These simulation results evaluate the consequence
of a stuck breaker at the red bus that is specially indicated by a down arrow.
Red lines are outaged in the cascade and red buses with no down arrow are
buses at which load is shed. (The lower cascade sheds no load.)
according to their distance in the network1 from the initial
fault. The generations of lines for two example cascades
are shown in Fig. 2. Moreover, if a breaker fails, then all
subsequent events form a new generation.
Most events only involve primary protection outaging com-
ponents next to the fault and all these outages are considered
to be generation one. In this paper we consider only line faults
in generation one, but the methods can be generalized. Occa-
sionally the outages spread beyond the primary protection to
higher generations further from the fault. The cascading events
include load shed as well outages of lines and transformers
and protection misoperations. Any load shed is assigned to
the previously occurring highest generation.
This processing of the cascading events into generations
based primarily on distance in the network and breaker
misoperations is crude and simple. However, this simple
1Network distance between 2 elements is defined as the minimum number
of buses one has to pass through in the network to pass from one element to
the other element. For example, lines with a common bus are distance 1 apart.
processing appears to work well for our initial cascading data.
In particular, the generations defined this way mostly agree
with the time order of the events. Reference [10] processes
cascading events into generations based on event timing.
More sophisticated processing into generations based on both
space and time are expected for the more general cascades
simulated in future work.
1) Metrics for cascade size, propagation, cost and risk:
The size of the cascade can be measured in terms of the
MW load shed, the estimated blackout cost, the number of
lines/transformers tripped or the number of isolated buses [11].
It is useful to express these metrics as the average cascade
size; that is, the cascade size averaged over the sampled
line faults. The average cascade size is the expected value
of the cascade size assuming that each of the line faults is
equally likely. (While we do not consider this, the extension
to a weighted sum that considers line faults with different
probabilities is straightforward.) Thus the average cascade size
over a sample of line faults is naturally a probability-based
metric. In particular, the average cost (the expected value of
cascade cost) is the cascade risk.
The usual consequence of a line fault is that the breakers
open at both ends of the line, and that radially connected load
supplied through that line (if any) is shed. However, there is a
small probability pstuck that one of the breakers at the ends of
the line will stick and fail to open. We use the representative
value pstuck = 0.01 based on the range of values in [12]. The
simulation evaluates the impact of the stuck breaker. A breaker
sticking has the same effect as a bus fault at that end of the
line. Given the straightforward consequences of the correctly
operating breakers (one line outaged, no transformers outaged,
only radial load shed), for this paper it is efficient to only
simulate the bus faults, and account for the correctly opening
breakers in the processing [5].
We divide the cascade into the primary protection initial
events in generation 1 and the subsequent events in generations
2 and higher. We can measure the size of the initial part of
the cascade, the size of the subsequent part of the cascade
and the total cascade size. Of particular interest is the size of
the subsequent part of the cascade, since this quantifies the
events beyond the necessary primary protection actions that
are generally considered as “cascading”.
Blackout costs are difficult to estimate, even if only the
direct blackout costs are considered and the very significant
reputational, regulatory and other indirect costs are neglected.
However, because the investment in mitigation should be
driven by cost and risk, it is necessary to make some ap-
proximate assumption about blackout costs. Here we follow
[13] in approximating direct blackout costs in dollars as 2
C = 500(real power shed)1.5 $. The expected value R of
the cost metric C properly accounts for fault and breaker
misoperation probability as well as the cost or impact of the




(cascade probability) (cascade cost C). (1)
2The constant multiplier 500 is very approximate and is obtained by
combining the estimate EENS = 0.5(real power shed)1.5 MWh from [13]
with a blackout cost guesstimate of $1000 for 1 MWh.



















Fig. 3. Survival function probability distribution of cascade cost. Almost half
the cascades have cost zero. Note log-log scale.
More precisely, R is the system cascading risk assuming a line
fault.
There are two metrics that directly describe the cascade
propagation. ρ is the average probability that a generation of
events produces a further generation, and Ngen is the average
number of generations. These two metrics are closely related
according to Ngen = 11−ρ or ρ = 1− 1Ngen .
Table I shows metrics for the 130-bus test system. These
metrics are system-wide probability weighted averages of the
metrics assuming a line fault. The last column of Table I shows
the metrics quantifying the increased cascading size and risk
when the load is increased by 50%. Changes in metrics can
be useful in assessing system upgrades.
Fig. 3 shows a large range of cascade costs from zero
to almost 10,000 and a probability distribution of cost with
a heavy tail. The heavy tail implies that higher impact low
frequency cascades occur both rarely and routinely, and this
makes these cascades a substantial concern. (In contrast,
extreme events are vanishingly unlikely in most conventional
probability distributions with exponentially decreasing tails.)
Heavy tails in the distribution of cascade size or impact are a
characteristic feature of the cascading phenomenon [10], [13],
[14].
2) Critical components and mitigation: We present two
initial approaches to risk mitigation.
The first approach focuses on mitigating breaker failures
and line faults at the beginning of the cascade. Equation (1)
for total risk has terms pcascade Ccascade that are the risk
contribution of the cascading following a stuck breaker after
a line fault. We can rank these contributions of these buses
to the risk, and focus on maintaining the relays and breakers
at these buses or hardening the lines incident on these buses
against line faults.
Looking more closely at the total risk of 12.37 in Table I,
it is useful to examine the bus faults that contribute the most to
the total risk. Table II shows the top 5 bus faults that contribute
most to the risk. Table II shows that the top 3 bus faults
at buses 1101, 1100, 1000 are responsible for (4.17 + 2.09
+ 2.09)/12.32=68% of the risk. Therefore mitigating the risk
by suppressing the beginnings of the cascade should focus
on maintaining the relays and breakers at buses 1101, 1100,
TABLE I. CASCADING METRICS
cascading metric base case load 1.5×base case load
real power shed (MW) 0.0543 0.07586
risk R ($) 12.37 43.38
number of lines out 1.051 1.065
number of transformers out 0.0344 0.04611
number of generations Ngen 1.041 1.046
chance of further propagation ρ 0.0397 0.0439
1000, or hardening the lines incident on buses 1101, 1100,
1000 against faults. Here we are mitigating the subsequent
cascading risk in generations 2 and higher, since the part of
the risk directly due to the initial line fault corresponds to
correct protection action and is always incurred.
The second approach focuses on mitigating the cascading
risk throughout the cascade as it propagates. The idea is to
associate each component (line or transformer) with the “risk
after”, which is the total risk of the subsequent cascading after
that component outages in any cascade. “After” means that
the time of the outages in the subsequent cascading is strictly
greater than the time of the component outage. The “cost after”
for each cascade is then multiplied by the probability of the
subsequent part of the cascading and then summed over the
cascades involving that component to obtain the “risk after”.
The rationale for the “risk after” is that if the component
had not outaged in the cascades then the subsequent load
shed would often be mitigated. “Risk after” accounts for the
component participation in any of the cascades, weighted to
account for more heavily cascades that are more likely and that
have higher cost (more load shed) after that component fails.
A component that outages in cascades with no subsequent load
loss in each of these cascades will have “risk after” of zero.
The components with the top 5 values of “risk after” are
shown in Table III. Mitigation of these components outaging,
either by hardening the component so that it tends not to out-
age, or by mitigating the effects of the component outaging on
other components can be expected to suppress the interactions
by which the cascade propagates further to cause load shed
and incur blackout cost.
TABLE II. 5 BUS FAULTS THAT CONTRIBUTE MOST TO CASCADE RISK
faulted bus probability cost risk contribution
1101 0.000444 9390. 4.17
1100 0.000222 9390. 2.09
1000 0.000222 9390. 2.09
1301 0.000556 1340. 0.746
1701 0.000333 2060. 0.688
TABLE III. “RISK AFTER” FOR THE 5 MOST CRITICAL COMPONENTS
Component Risk after
LINE 1100-1101 (1) 0.010625
LINE 801-1101 (1) 0.00910711
LINE 1100-1102 (1) 0.00758926
LINE 1101-1700 (1) 0.00655778
TRANSFORMER 1101-1150 (1) 0.0060714
V. CONCLUSION
Modeling, simulation, and analysis of cascading failure is a
challenging task, yet it is becoming increasingly important as
more cascading failures have been observed over the last two
decades. This paper advances the state-of-the-art in cascading
failure studies by demonstrating an initial proof of principle
for:
(1) Use of integrated dynamics and protection models that
more accurately model a cascading failure. TS3ph, a three-
phase dynamics simulator, is interfaced with Electrocon’s
protection simulation tool CAPE to accurately represent the
response of the protection actions as the dynamics evolve
after an initial disturbance. This integrated dynamics and
protection simulation philosophy brings together protection
and transmission (or distribution) planning/operation engineers
who typically work in silos.
(2) Providing new ways of processing volumes of cascading
simulation data, including rare but high-impact events, to
compute metrics to quantify cascading impact and risk. Metrics
for cascade size (in terms of MW load shed, number of lines
or transformers outaged), cascading propagation, and cascade
risk and cost are formulated and presented.
(3) Developing two new ways to identify critical components,
the elements that participate most in cascading failures, for
mitigating the risk of cascading. The first approach focuses on
breaker failures and line faults at the beginning of the cascade,
while the second one associates a “risk after” value for each
component that describes the total risk of subsequent cascading
after that component outages.
(4) Instead of examining a handful of most likely outages or
cascades, as typically done in the industry, our methodology
samples more comprehensively from a series of events that
span low-probability low-impact events to the low-probability
high-impact events that can pose a substantial risk. Accounting
for these rare but risky cascading events produces much data,
so to be useful, the advances in modeling and simulation are
coupled with advances in data processing and analytics that
compute meaningful metrics from the voluminous cascading
outage simulation data.
A 130-bus system was prepared to demonstrate the modeling,
simulation, and analysis advancements done in this project.
A series of simulations were conducted involving bus fault
events that produced tripping of equipment and load loss. The
analysis of this cascading simulation data provides insight into
the cascading size, propagation, and risk, and a crude estimate
of the dollar impact. It is important to follow analysis through
to the dollar impact, even if the estimates are rough, since
this provides quantitative guidance for justifiable investments
in mitigation. The cascading risk increased three-fold when
the loading on the system increased by 50%. The analysis
also provides information on critical elements that participate
most in the cascade initiation or propagation. The analysis
enables the joint consideration of both more frequent, smaller
cascading outages and rarer, higher impact outages. Both
should be mitigated for high reliability and the analysis allows
this to be done on the basis of their contribution to overall
risk.
We have developed an initial version of practical risk-based
cascading simulation, with detailed dynamics and protection,
and analysis that accounts for high impact low probability
events in power system. Compared with the existing cascading
failure simulation and analysis tools that consider protection
systems and dynamics, including the Dynamic Contingency
Analysis Tool (DCAT) developed by PNNL [8], this project
uses detailed dynamics modeling (three-phase network and
single-phase induction motor with stalling capability) and
protection system models in CAPE for high-fidelity protection
modeling. There are prospects for faster simulation for larger
networks (assuming data availability). We also have initiated a
new analysis methodology that uses a probabilistic/risk based
approach to perform systematic sampling and risk quantifica-
tion from the simulation output.
An important step in the future is to expand the range,
depth, and speed of the combined modeling, simulation, and
data processing to encompass more different types of events
and interactions. Pursuing this in an integrated way will enable
a comprehensive risk-based identification and mitigation of the
protection related mechanisms of cascading failure.
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